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Abstract. Recent studies have shown that a population acting not only
upon self-interest but also exhibiting some morality preference has an
evolutionary advantage. Specifically, in the setting of a symmetric fit-
ness game, a resident population is evolutionary stable against all types
of mutants if it has the utility function of Homo-moralis, with a morality
equal to the assortativity. In this paper, we extend the scope of analysis
allowing for the presence of a diversity of preferences in the popula-
tion. Establishing a Payoff Equality condition, we prove the possibility
of co-existence of two residents in the population. We then introduce
a tripartite assortment function and study the conditions for the evo-
lutionary stability of this diverse population. In the case of a constant
assortment function, we show the existence of an evolutionary stable and
heterogeneous resident population.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Homo-moralis, Fitness game,
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1 Introduction
The choice of a self-centered selfish utility in economics has long been chal-
lenged and moderated by economists since the early history of the profession.
Smith (1759) for instance, in his “Theory of moral sentiments” considered the
idea of moral motivation in human decisions. More recently, Arrow (1973), Laf-
font (1975), Sen (1977), and Tabellini (2008) also included moral value in their
consideration of economic behaviors. In a comprehensive analysis of such alter-
native preference models, Alger and Weibull (2013) introduce Homo-moralis, a
new type of preferences which appears to be the most robust in terms of evo-
lutionary stability. The model of Homo-moralis integrates the classical selfish
“Homo-economicus” and adds to it a “moral term” which accounts for the pref-
erence of the right thing to do. The strength of the model of Alger and Weibull
2holds not only in its accounting for morality but also in the fact that a popula-
tion of agents can be evolutionary stable if it has a certain type of Homo-moralis
preferences. The degree of morality of the only evolutionary stable agent depends
on the assortativity that governs the interactions between agents.
The introduction of Homo-moralis elegantly tackles the limits of the use of
selfishness-based rational preferences. However, by predicting the survival of one
and only one type of preferences in the society it limits the possibilities to a
unique uniform type of population with the same preferences and behaviors. As
introduced by Alger and Weibull (2013), Homo-moralis implies the presence of
a single type of agent in the evolutionary surviving population. This conclu-
sion contradicts the observed heterogeneity of behaviors and preferences among
agents. Agents exhibit a variety of behaviors and actions when confronted with
similar choices. This paper aims at evaluating the possibility of including this
heterogeneity in the underlying mathematical model supporting the superiority
of Homo-moralis.
In a recent discussion on the evolutionary foundations and the policy im-
plications of Homo-moralis preferences, Alger and Weibull (2016) suggest the
presence in a society of a variety of individuals with different preferences. These
preferences could be different types of Homo-moralis (i.e. with different moral-
ity coefficients) or even have other kinds of preferences (altruism, spitefulness,
etc.). Being influenced by various cultural, geographical and societal factors,
individuals might develop distinct preferences. This paper aims at evaluating
the evolutionary stability of such a hypothesis and the conditions under which
distinct preferences could steadily co-exist in an interactive society. Hence, we
first extend the assortment function introduced by Bergstrom (2003) to three
interacting populations. We then show that under few conditions it is possible
to observe the coexistence of two types of resident populations consistently play-
ing different strategies and achieving Payoff Equality. We also show that in the
case of a constant assortment function there exist a heterogeneous evolutionary
stable resident population.
We implement our analysis in the context of large populations with pair-
wise matched interactions. Following Güth and Yaari (1992) we build our model
within an indirect evolutionary framework where the behavior of agents is driven
by personal preferences but the evolutionary success is driven by some exoge-
nous payoff (fitness) function. In order to avoid seeing the agents deviating from
their objective payoff maximization (Robson (1990), Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya
(2007)), we consider that the (subjective) personal preferences of agents are only
known by the agent in question. However, even though the preferences are the
agents’ private information, building on Bergstrom (2003), we consider that the
interactions between agents are not random. Specifically, the meeting probability
between two individuals follows an assortative matching process rather than the
more classical uniform random matching. This assortative matching process is
exogenous and is defined by the index of assortativity which sets the likelihood
for a mutant to interact with another mutant rather than with a resident when
a mutation occurs. The fitness game we consider clearly applies to symmetric
3interactions but also to asymmetric interactions with ex-ante symmetry. In other
words, in each interaction individuals are as likely to be in one or the side of the
interaction. For studying the evolutionary stability, we follow the standard def-
inition of Maynard Smith and Price (1973), applying it to preference evolution
rather than strategies. To do so we follow Dekel et al. (2007) and consider that
in a given matched interaction agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
game under incomplete information.
Using this theoretical setting, we explore the overlooked aspect of population
diversity and find that under an assortative matching of agents, it is possible to
have a heterogeneous population exhibiting Payoff Equality and evolutionary
stability to any mutant invasion. The organization of the rest of the paper is
as follows: Section 2 sets up the model extending the assortment function to
more than three populations, Section 3 introduces the Payoff Equality condition,
Section 4 studies evolutionary stability in the case of a constant assortment
function and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and definitions
2.1 A Population with one resident
The first part of this section introduces the general setting in the classical case
of a bilateral interaction between a unique resident and a mutant. Therefore we
introduce some definitions and results useful for the rest of the paper.
As in Alger and Weibull (2013), we consider a population where individuals
are randomly matched into pairs to engage in a symmetric interaction with the
common strategy set X. We assume that X is a nonempty, compact and convex
set. Individuals are utility maximizers, and their behavior depends on their type
θ ∈ Θ, i.e. their preferences which are described by a continuous utility function
uθ : X
2 → R. Individuals’ success in the game is determined by the resulting
payoffs: if θ ∈ Θ plays strategy x ∈ X when τ ∈ Θ plays strategy y ∈ X, θ gets
π(x, y) where we assume π : X2 → R to be continuous.
We consider a population of two types θ, τ ∈ Θ. The two types and their
respective shares define a population state s = (θ, τ, ε), where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the
population share of τ . If ε is small, we call θ the resident type and τ the mutant
type (see Figure 1).
θτ
ε
Fig. 1. A two-types population with θ the resident and τ the mutant
4The matching process is random and exogenous, and it may be assortative.
Let Pr[τ |θ, ε] be the probability that individual θ is matched with individual τ
in the population state s = (θ, τ, ε), we can define the assortment function and
assortativity:
Definition 1 (Assortment function and assortativity). In a population
state s = (θ, τ, ε) with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let φ(ε) be the the difference between the
conditional probabilities for an individual to be matched with an individual with
type θ, given that the individual herself has type θ or τ .
We have: φ(ε) = Pr[θ|θ, ε] − Pr[θ|τ, ε], defining an assortment function φ :
(0, 1)→ [−1, 1].
Assuming φ is continuous and converges as ε tends to zero, the assortativity
σ ∈ [0, 1] is the limit of φ in zero: limε→0 φ(ε) = σ
Individuals choose their strategy in order to maximize their utility. A Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a pair of strategies, one for each type, where each
strategy is a best reply to the other in the given population state:
Definition 2 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). In any state s = (θ, τ, ε), a
strategy pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ X2 is a (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium if:


x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
Pr[θ|θ, ǫ] · uθ(x, x
∗) + Pr[τ |θ, ǫ] · uθ(x, y
∗)
y∗ ∈ argmax
y∈X
Pr[θ|τ, ǫ] · uτ (y, x
∗) + Pr[τ |τ, ǫ] · uτ (y, y
∗)
The set of Bayesian Nash Equilibria in population state s = (θ, τ, ε), i.e. all
solutions (x∗, y∗), is called BNE(s) ⊆ X2.
This definition allows us to introduce a useful result put forward by Alger
and Weibull (2013):
Lemma 1 (Alger and Weibull Lemma 1). BNE(s) is compact for each
(θ, τ, ε) ∈ Θ2 × [0, 1). If uθ and uτ are concave in their first arguments then
BNE(s) 6= ∅. The correspondence BNE(θ, τ, ·) : [0, 1) ⇒ X2 is upper hemi-
continuous.
Concerning the (objective) payoff (fitness) functions, we have, when θ plays
x ∈ X and τ plays y ∈ X, the following resulting payoffs:
Πθ(x, y, ε) = Pr[θ|θ, ε] · π(x, x) + Pr[τ |θ, ε] · π(x, y)
Πτ (x, y, ε) = Pr[θ|τ, ε] · π(y, x) + Pr[τ |τ, ε] · π(y, y)
(1)
Hence, considering the case of a resident population of type θ, what happens
when mutants of type τ "invade" the resident population? If the resident pop-
ulation θ withstands a small-scale invasion of τ , then θ is called evolutionary
stable against τ . Or, in other words, if an individual θ makes a mistake when
deciding on its strategy and plays like a type τ , the error will not propagate:
5Definition 3 (Evolutionary-stability). A type θ ∈ Θ is evolutionary sta-
ble against a type τ ∈ Θ if there exists an ε¯ > 0 such that Πθ(x
∗, y∗, ε) >
Πτ (x
∗, y∗, ε) in all Nash equilibria (x∗, y∗) in all states s = (θ, τ, ε) with ε ∈
(0, ε¯).
A type θ ∈ Θ is evolutionary stable if it is evolutionary stable against all
types τ 6= θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 4 (Evolutionary-unstability). A type θ ∈ Θ is evolutionary un-
stable if there exists a type τ ∈ Θ and an ε¯ > 0 such that Πθ(x
∗, y∗, ε) <
Πτ (x
∗, y∗, ε) in all Nash equilibria (x∗, y∗) in all states s = (θ, τ, ε) with ε ∈
(0, ε¯).
A peculiar type of preference in our context, introduced by Alger and Weibull
(2013), is the preference of Homo-moralis. This type of preferences includes all
linear convex combination of selfishness and morality as follows:
Definition 5 (Homo-moralis). An individual is a homo-moralis if her utility
function is of the form:
uκ(x, y) = (1− κ) · π(x, y) + κ · π(x, x) (2)
where κ ∈ [0, 1] is her degree of morality.
If the degree of morality is equal to the assortativity κ = σ, then the individual
is called homo hamiltonensis. If κ = 0, then the individual is a homo-oeconomicus
(fully selfish). If κ = 1, then the individual is a homo-kantiensis (fully moral).
For each type θ ∈ Θ, βθ denotes the best-reply correspondence:
βθ(y) = argmax
x∈X
uθ(x, y) ∀y ∈ X
and Xθ the set of fixed-points under βθ:
Xθ = {x ∈ X : x ∈ βθ(x)}
For example, we call Xσ is the set of fixed-points for homo-hamiltonensis, i.e.
the Hamiltonian strategies. Moreover, we define the concept of behavioral-alike:
Definition 6 (Behavioral-alike). Types θ and τ are behavioral alikes if they
are behaviorally indistinguishable. Let θ be the resident, the set of of types τ that
are behaviorally alikes to θ is called Θθ
Θθ = {τ ∈ Θ : ∃x ∈ Xθ s.t. (x, x) ∈ B
NE(θ, τ, 0)}
Finally, the type set Θ is called rich if for each strategy x ∈ X, there exists some
type θ ∈ Θ for which this strategy is strictly dominant. In other words, Θ is rich
if, for any strategy in the game, there exists a mutant to play it.
These definitions allow us to clearly state the main result of Alger andWeibull
(2013):
6Theorem 1 (Alger and Weibull Theorem 1). If βσ(x) is a singleton for all
x ∈ Xσ, then homo-hamiltonensis is evolutionary stable against all types τ /∈ Θσ.
If Θ is rich, Xθ∩Xσ = ∅, and Xθ is a singleton, then θ is evolutionary unstable.
The theorem means that only a strategy played by homo-hamiltonensis xσ ∈
Xσ is evolutionary stable. Considering a population of homo-hamiltonensis and
a mutant that wishes to enter the population, if the mutant is not behaviorally-
alike to homo-hamiltonensis, he has no chance. If the mutant is a homo-moralis
with a morality different from the assortativity (κ 6= σ), such that this homo-
moralis and homo-hamiltonensis are not behaviorally-alike, then to enter the
population, the morality of the homo-moralis should evolve in direction of the
assortativity.
In Alger and Weibull (2013), the type of resident is unique living in a per-
fectly homogeneous population. But is this a required feature of the resident
population? What happens when the population is more diverse? Is it possible
to have a stable population of two residents? Our paper explores the case of a
population where two types live together.
2.2 A Population with two residents
We expand the previous model by adding another type. Now the population is
made of two residents θ1 and θ2, and one mutant τ (see Figure 2) . The three
types and their respective shares define a population state s = (θ1, θ2, τ, (λ, ε)),
where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the population share of τ and λ ∈ (0, 1) 3 is the share of θ2
with respect to θ1. Thus, the population share of θ2 is λ2 = λ(1 − ε) and the
population share of θ1 is λ1 = (1− λ)(1− ε).
Individuals are still randomly matched into pairs to engage in a symmetric
interaction with the common strategy set X. The matching process is random
and exogenous, and it may be assortative.
θ1
(λ1)
θ2
(λ2)
τ
ε
Fig. 2. A three-types population with θ1 and θ2 the residents and τ the mutant
For the sake of tractability, we introduce a new notation. The probability
that individual θ1 is matched with individual θ2 is called p21 = Pr[θ2|θ1, (λ, ε)].
Similarly, p11 = Pr[θ1|θ1, (λ, ε)] and p31 = Pr[τ |θ1, (λ, ε)].
Extending the concept of (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium seen above to the
case of three types of agents (θ1, θ2, τ), we have:
3 When λ = 0 or λ = 1, there is only one resident in the population (Section 2.1).
7Definition 7 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). In a population state s = (θ1, θ2, τ, (λ, ε)),
(x1, x2, y) ∈ X3 is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium if


x1 ∈ argmax
x∈X
p11 · uθ1(x, x
1) + p21 · uθ1(x, x
2) + p31 · uθ1(x, y)
x2 ∈ argmax
x∈X
p12 · uθ2(x, x
1) + p22 · uθ2(x, x
2) + p32 · uθ2(x, y)
y ∈ argmax
x∈X
p13 · uτ (x, x
1) + p23 · uτ (x, x
2) + p33 · uτ (x, y)
(3)
Note that when τ is a mutant, i.e. when ε goes to zero, we have p31 = p32 = 0,
and θ1, θ2 behave as if τ was not in the population. Bayesian Nash Equilibria
are then the same as in Definition 2.
Matching probability and assortment
In this paragraph, building on Bergstrom (2003), we introduce a novel, tripartite
assortment function allowing for matching and interactions between three dis-
tinct populations. In our case, the three populations are the two residents and
the mutant.
We have three matching conditions on the probability:

p11 + p21 + p31 = 1
p12 + p22 + p32 = 1
p13 + p23 + p33 = 1
(4)
In other words, an individual is matched with an individual θ1, θ2 or τ with
probability one.
There are also three balancing conditions:

λ2 · p12 = λ1 · p21
ε · p13 = λ1 · p31
ε · p23 = λ2 · p32
(5)
Balancing conditions insure the coherence of the assortative matching. In other
words, they guarantee that the probability of the event "being of type θ1 and
being matched with an individual of type θ2" is the same as the probability of
the event "being of type θ2 and being matched with an individual of type θ1" so
that no individual in the population is left without being matched. For instance:
Pr[θ = θ2] · Pr[θ1|θ2, (λ, ε)] = Pr[θ = θ1] · Pr[θ2|θ1, (λ, ε)]
λ2 · p12 = λ1 · p21
Now we need to redefine the notion of assortment function and assortativity
for a population made of more than two types:
Definition 8 (Assortment function and assortativity). Let θ be a member
of a diverse population made of two types or more, and λ the share of θ in the
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to be matched with type θ, given that the individual herself has type θ or any
other type (θ¯) is called φ(λ).
We have φ(λ) = Pr[θ|θ, λ] − Pr[θ|θ¯, λ], defining an assortment function φ :
(0, 1)→ [−1, 1].
Note that φ(λ) = φ(1 − λ) because of balancing conditions and by symme-
try since the assortment process is exogenous and does not depend on the type:
Pr[θ|θ, λ] = 1− Pr[θ¯|θ, λ] and Pr[θ|θ¯, λ] = 1− Pr[θ¯|θ¯, λ].
Assuming φ is continuous and converges as λ tends to zero, the assortativity
σ ∈ [0, 1] is the limit of φ in zero: limλ→0 φ(λ) = σ
For example, in a three-types population s = (θ1, θ2, τ, (λ, ε)), for θ1 we have:
φ(λ1) = Pr[θ1|θ1, (λ, ε)]− Pr[θ1|θ¯1, (λ, ε)]
= Pr[θ1|θ1, (λ, ε)]− Pr[θ1|θ2 ∪ τ, (λ, ε)]
= Pr[θ1|θ1, (λ, ε)]−
λ2 · Pr[θ1|θ2, (λ, ε)] + ε · Pr[θ1|τ, (λ, ε)]
1− λ1
= p11 −
λ2 · p12 + ε · p13
1− λ1
The same applies for θ2 and τ , giving us three assortment conditions:


(1− λ1) · φ(λ1) = (1− λ1) · p11 − λ2 · p12 − ε · p13
(1− λ2) · φ(λ2) = (1− λ2) · p22 − λ1 · p21 − ε · p23
(1− ε) · φ(ε) = (1− ε) · p33 − λ1 · p31 − λ2 · p32
(6)
Solving the system of linear equations 4, 5 and 6, we can rewrite the matching
probabilities in function of the share of each type in the population and the
assortment. Let ψ(λ) = λ · (1− λ) · (1− φ(λ)), we have:
p11 = λ1 + (1− λ1) · φ(λ1)
p21 =
ψ(λ1)+ψ(λ2)−ψ(ε)
2λ1
p31 =
ψ(λ1)−ψ(λ2)+ψ(ε)
2λ1
p12 =
ψ(λ1)+ψ(λ2)−ψ(ε)
2λ2
p22 = λ2 + (1− λ2) · φ(λ2)
p32 =
−ψ(λ1)+ψ(λ2)+ψ(ε)
2λ2
p13 =
ψ(λ1)−ψ(λ2)+ψ(ε)
2ε
p23 =
−ψ(λ1)+ψ(λ2)+ψ(ε)
2ε
p33 = ε+ (1− ε) · φ(ε)
(7)
We can calculate the limits when ε goes to zero, since τ is a mutant in this
population. We have: λ1 −−−→
ε→0
(1− λ) and λ2 −−−→
ε→0
λ. For simplicity, we assume
9φ(·) to be differentiable, such that φ′(λ) = −φ′(1− λ) because φ(λ) = φ(1− λ).
p11 −−−→
ε→0
(1− λ) + λ · φ(λ)
p21 −−−→
ε→0
λ · (1− φ(λ))
p31 −−−→
ε→0
0
p12 −−−→
ε→0
(1− λ) · (1− φ(λ))
p22 −−−→
ε→0
λ+ (1− λ) · φ(λ)
p32 −−−→
ε→0
0
p13 −−−→
ε→0
−λ·(1−λ)·φ
′(λ)
2 + (1− λ) · (1− φ(λ)) +
φ(λ)−σ
2
p23 −−−→
ε→0
λ·(1−λ)·φ′(λ)
2 + λ · (1− φ(λ)) +
φ(λ)−σ
2
p33 −−−→
ε→0
σ
(8)
We show the calculation to get p13. We have:
ψ(λ1) = (1− λ)(1− ε)(λ+ ε(1− λ)) · (1− φ(λ1))
ψ(λ2) = λ(1− ε)(1− λ+ ελ) · (1− φ(λ2))
So we can rewrite p13:
p13 = (1− ε)
(
λ(1− λ) · (φ(λ2)− φ(λ1))
2ε
+
(1− λ)2(1− φ(λ1))− λ
2(1− φ(λ2))
2
+
(1− φ(ε))
2
)
And, using limε→0 φ(λ1) = limε→0 φ(λ2) = φ(λ), L’Hôpital’s rule and φ
′(λ) =
−φ′(1− λ), we have:
lim
ε→0
p13 =
λ(1− λ)
2
· lim
ε→0
[
φ(λ2)− φ(λ1)
ε
]
+
(1− 2λ)(1− φ(λ))
2
+
(1− σ)
2
=
λ(1− λ)
2
· lim
ε→0
[
φ(λ(1− ε))− φ((1− λ)(1− ε))
ε
]
+ (1− λ)(1− φ(λ)) +
φ(λ)− σ
2
=
λ(1− λ) · [−λφ′(λ) + (1− λ)φ′(1− λ)]
2
+ (1− λ)(1− φ(λ)) +
φ(λ)− σ
2
= −
λ(1− λ)φ′(λ)
2
+ (1− λ)(1− φ(λ)) +
φ(λ)− σ
2
We can obtain p23 from similar calculations. Note that it is not necessary (but
convenient) to assume φ(·) to be differentiable.
3 Payoff Equality
The core contribution of this paper resides in the consideration of the cohabita-
tion of more than one type in the resident population. What happens then? If
one type dominates the other, for example if θ1 gets a higher payoff than θ2, it
seems unlikely that θ2 would survive. Thus, we need to impose a condition for
the mutual coexistence of two distinct types without one overcoming (or invad-
ing) the other. We call it the Payoff Equality condition. This section evaluates
the conditions under which this Payoff Equality is met.
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3.1 Payoff Equality condition
Let’s assume (x1, x2) ∈ X2 is a BNE in the population state s = (θ1, θ2, λ), with
x1 6= x2 and λ ∈ (0, 1). The Payoff Equality condition is met when:
Πθ1(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ2(x
1, x2, λ) (9)
We can write the payoffs of θ1 and θ2 (Equation (1)) using the matching prob-
abilities with only two residents derived in (8) and the notation πij = π(xi, xj):
Πθ1(x
1, x2, λ) = (1− λ+ λφ(λ)) · π11 + λ(1− φ(λ)) · π12
Πθ2(x
1, x2, λ) = (1− λ)(1− φ(λ)) · π21 + (λ+ (1− λ)φ(λ)) · π22
(10)
Under what conditions on the payoffs (π11, π12, π21, π22) and on λ ∈ (0, 1)
are total payoffs are equal?
We simply equate the expressions of the payoff functions of θ1 and θ2 (equa-
tion (10)), which gives, after rearranging, the following condition:
λ(1− φ(λ))(π11 + π22 − π12 − π21) = π11 − π21 − φ(λ)(π22 − π21)
This equation can be rewritten by reordering the terms to put forward the
share of θ1 in the population ((1− λ)), as follows:
(1− λ)(1− φ(λ))(π11 + π22 − π12 − π21) = π22 − π12 − φ(λ)(π11 − π12)
Then using the notations:
Qpi = π
11 − π21 − φ(λ)(π22 − π21)
Rpi = π
22 − π12 − φ(λ)(π11 − π12)
Spi = (π
11 + π22 − π12 − π21)
(11)
Note that, combining the equations in (11), we have: Qpi+Rpi = (1−φ(λ))Spi.
We can rewrite the Payoff Equality condition to obtain two equivalent equa-
tions, one for λ and the other for (1− λ):
λ(1− φ(λ))Spi = Qpi (12)
(1− λ)(1− φ(λ))Spi = Rpi (13)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Payoff Equality). Let (x1, x2) ∈ X2 be a BNE in the pop-
ulation state s = (θ1, θ2, λ), with x
1 6= x2 and λ ∈ (0, 1). The Payoff Equality
condition Πθ1(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ2(x
1, x2, λ) is satisfied if and only if:
1. Qpi = 0 and Spi = 0, or
2. Qpi 6= 0 and Rpi 6= 0 are of the same sign, and λ(1− φ(λ)) = Qpi/Spi, or
3. Qpi = 0, Rpi = 0, Spi 6= 0 and φ(λ) = 1.
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Note that for all other possible cases, Payoff Equality is not satisfied.
Proof. First, let’s assume that Payoff Equality is satisfied. We distinguish two
cases:
When φ(λ) = 1:
Since we have Payoff Equality, equations (12) and (13) are satisfied and we
necessarily have that Qpi = Rpi = 0 (since (1 − φ(λ)) = 0). Then either Spi = 0
and we are in case 1. of the proposition, or Spi 6= 0 and we are in case 3. of the
proposition.
When φ(λ) 6= 1:
Payoff equality (equations (12) and (13)) implies only two possibilities.
Either Qpi = 0 and then Spi = 0 and we are in the case 1. of the proposition.
Or Qpi 6= 0 and then since (1 − φ(λ)) > 0 and λ > 0, Qpi and Spi are of
the same sign. Moreover, since λ < 1, Rpi and Spi have the same sign. Finally,
dividing (12) by Spi 6= 0 we have: λ(1− φ(λ)) = Qpi/Spi and we are in case 2. of
the proposition.
For the converse, using similar arguments, if one of the three cases (1.,2.,3.
of Proposition 1) is true then the condition stated in equation (12) is satisfied
and we have Payoff Equality.

Here are a few examples for each case of the proposition:
1. (a) If π12 = π11 = π22 = π21. No matter the share of each type, they will
get the same payoff.
(b) If π21 = π11 6= π22 = π12, and if φ(λ) = 0. Without assortment, the
matching probability are equal to the share in the population.
2. (a) If {π11 = π22, π11 > π12, π11 > π21} or if {π11 = π22, π11 < π12,
π11 < π21}, and if λ = (π11 − π21)/Spi and φ(λ) 6= 1. In the special case
where π12 = π21, then λ should be equal to 1/2.
(b) If {π12 = π21 = π11 6= π22} or if {π11 6= π22 = π12 = π21}, and if
λ = −φ(λ)/(1−φ(λ)). Note that in this case the assortment is negative:
φ(λ) < 0.
3. An assortativity equal to 1 means that θ1 only meets θ1, getting π
11, while
θ2 only meets θ2, getting π
22.
4. If π12 = π11 6= π22 = π21, then there is no λ that satisfies Payoff Equality.
No matter the share in the population, one player will always get more than
the other.
3.2 Case of constant assortment
Having established the conditions for an equality of the payoffs among two types
of resident population, we now consider the case of a constant assortment func-
tion and show the peculiarity of homo-hamiltonensis introduced by Alger and
Weibull (2013) in this special case. Homo-hamiltonensis’ strategies are closely
related to the Payoff Equality condition when the assortment function is con-
stant. We recall that Xσ is the set of fixed-points for homo-hamiltonensis, i.e.
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the strategies that homo-hamiltonensis could play when she is the only resi-
dent in the population. We define: X1 × X2 = {(x
1, x2) ⊆ BNE(s) such that
x1 6= x2}. X1 × X2 is the set of solutions of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
problem such that θ1 and θ2 do not play the same strategy. In the following, we
assume that the assortment is constant, equal to the assortativity (by continu-
ity): ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], φ(λ) = σ ∈ [0, 1]. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Payoff Equality and Hamiltonian strategies). When the as-
sortment is constant, suppose that Xσ is not a singleton and let (θ1, θ2, λ) be a
population where θ1 plays x
1 , θ2 plays x
2, such that (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 ⊂ X
2
σ,
and λ = Qpi/(1− σ)Spi the share of θ2 in the population.
If βσ(x) is a singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies
the Payoff Equality condition.
Proof. Since θ1 plays x
1 ∈ Xσ, θ2 plays x
2 ∈ Xσ with x
1 6= x2, and βσ(x) is a
singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, we have:


x1 ∈ argmax
x∈X
uσ(x, x
1) ⇒ ∀x 6= x1 ∈ X, π(x1, x1) > (1− σ) · π(x, x1) + σ · π(x, x)
x2 ∈ argmax
y∈X
uσ(y, x
2) ⇒ ∀y 6= x2 ∈ X, π(x2, x2) > (1− σ) · π(y, x2) + σ · π(y, y)
In particular, for x = x2 and y = x1, we have:
{
π11 > (1− σ) · π21 + σ · π22 ⇒ Qpi > 0
π22 > (1− σ) · π12 + σ · π11 ⇒ Rpi > 0
Consequently, since λ = Qpi/((1 − σ)Spi) by assumption, we are in case 2. of
Proposition 1 and the Payoff Equality condition is satisfied.

3.3 Some examples on finite games
We now look at several examples in two-strategies games to illustrate the Payoff
Equality condition. We use the notation defined above πij = π(xi, xj) to describe
the payoff obtained by a player playing xi when her opponent plays xj . Moreover,
we denote by πij the payoff when pure strategy i is played against pure strategy
j. Also, we study in the following examples the case of a constant assortment
function.
Example 1 (Coordination game).
In the coordination game, players get reward only if they play the same
strategy. Suppose that the θ1 type plays strategy A while the θ2 type plays
strategy B. For a θ1 agent, when she is matched with a θ1 agent, she gets the
payoff πAA = πAA, and when she is matched with a θ2 agent, she gets π
AB =
πAB = 0.
Thus, Spi = πAA + πBB > 0, Qpi = πAA − σπBB and Rpi = πBB − σπAA. If
πAA = πBB , then we must have σ = 1 to satisfy Payoff Equality (we are then in
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case 3. of Proposition 1). If πAA > πBB , then λ = (πAA−σπBB)/[(1−σ)(πAA+
πBB)] satisfies Payoff Equality if σ < πBB/πAA (case 2. of Proposition 1).
Finally, if πAA < πBB , then λ = (πAA − σπBB)/[(1 − σ)(πAA + πBB)] satisfies
Payoff Equality if σ < πAA/πBB (case 2. of Proposition 1).
Table 1. Coordination game (piAA > 0 ; piBB > 0)
A B
A (piAA, piAA) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (piBB , piBB)
For example, when πAA = 2 and πBB = 1, λ = (2 − σ)/[3(1 − σ)] satisfies
Payoff Equality when σ < 1/2. With σ = 1/5, λ = 3/4, and θ1 and θ2 get the
same total payoff Π = 0.8. Under uniform random matching, σ = 0, we get the
mixed Nash equilibrium with λ = 2/3.
Table 2. Coordination game example
A B
A (2, 2) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
Example 2 (Prisoner’s dilemma).
In the prisoner’s dilemma, players can either cooperate or defect, getting
πCD = 0 < πDD < πCC < πDC . Suppose a homo-kantiensis (θ1, playing C)
plays with a homo-economicus (θ2, playing D).
Table 3. Prisoner’s dilemma
C D
C (piCC , piCC) (piCD, piDC)
D (piDC , piCD) (piDD, piDD)
(a) As a first example we consider the case when πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4
and πDC = 6. We then have Spi = −1 < 0, Qpi = −2 + 5σ and Rpi = 1 − 4σ.
Thus, there is a solution when 1/4 < σ < 2/5. With σ = 1/3, then λ = 1/2
and homo-kantiensis and homo-oeconomicus co-exist and get the same payoff
equal to Π = 9/3, which would be impossible without assortativity where only
homo-oeconomicus survives.
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(b) Now let πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4 and πDC = 5, we have Spi = 0,
Qpi = −1 + 4σ and Rpi = 1 − 4σ. Thus, we need σ = 1/4 to satisfy Payoff
Equality.
(c) Finally, let πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4 and πDC = 4.5, we have
Spi = 0.5 > 0, Qpi = −0.5 + 3.5σ and Rpi = 1 − 4σ. Thus, there is a solution
when 1/7 < σ < 1/4. For example, when σ = 1/5, then λ = 1/2 and homo-
kantiensis and homo-oeconomicus live together and get the same payoff equal to
Π = 12/5.
The three cases above are summarized in Table 4 below.
Table 4. Prisoner’s dilemma examples
(a)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 6)
D (6, 0) (1, 1)
(b)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
(c)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 4.5)
D (4.5, 0) (1, 1)
4 Evolutionary stability
After having assessed the conditions under which the coexistence of two distinct
resident populations is possible in Section 3, we study the evolutionary stability
of the resulting diverse resident population against mutant invasions. In all this
section, we consider the case of a constant assortment function and give the
conditions for evolutionary stability in this case. Note that, by continuity, the
assortment function is equal to the assortativity for all λ ∈ [0, 1]:
∀λ ∈ [0, 1], φ(λ) = σ ∈ [0, 1]
As we did for BNE we need to extend the definition of evolutionary stability
to a resident population having more than one type:
Definition 9 (Evolutionary-stability). In a mixed population made of two
distinct types θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ, with λ the share of θ2, the population (θ1, θ2, λ) is
evolutionary stable against a type τ 6= θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ if:
1. θ1 and θ2 satisfy the Payoff Equality condition when the mutant is absent:
Πθ1(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ2(x
1, x2, λ) in all (Bayesian) Nash equilibria (x1, x2) in
the population state s = (θ1, θ2, λ);
2. There exists an ε¯ > 0 such that Πθ1(x
1, x2, y, (λ, ε)) > Πτ (x
1, x2, y, (λ, ε))
and Πθ2(x
1, x2, y, (λ, ε)) > Πτ (x
1, x2, y, (λ, ε)) in all Nash equilibria (x1, x2, y)
in all states s = (θ1, θ2, τ, (λ, ε)) with ε ∈ (0, ε¯).
Moreover, θ1 and θ2 are evolutionary stable if they are evolutionary stable
against all types τ 6= θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ.
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We consider the case of finite symmetric 2 × 2 fitness games. Let A be the
matrix of the payoffs in this game, with πij is the payoff when pure strategy i
is played against pure strategy j. The payoff obtained by an individual playing
strategy x when matched with an individual playing y is then:
π(x, y) = xAy (14)
Let a population s = (θ1, θ2, τ, (λ, ε)), where θ1 and θ2 are the residents
playing x1 6= x2, and τ a mutant playing y such that (x1, x2, y) ∈ X3 is a
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, i.e. (3) is satisfied. Since we are in a two-strategies
game, we can express the strategy y in function of the strategies x1 and x2. For
this purpose, let α1, α2,∈ [0, 1] be the probabilities that θ1, θ2 attach to the first
pure strategy: x1 = (α1, 1−α1) and x
2 = (α2, 1−α2). Then, there exists γ ∈ R
such that y = γx1 + (1− γ)x2 = (γα1 + (1− γ)α2, 1− γα1 − (1− γ)α2)
4.
Suppose that the population s = (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality con-
dition: Πθ1(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ2(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ. Then, we can write the differences
in payoff between the residents and the mutant at the limit:
Lemma 2 (Difference in payoffs). For a population s = (θ1, θ2, λ) engaged
in a symmetric 2× 2 fitness game and satisfying the Payoff Equality condition,
the difference in payoffs between the residents and a mutant τ at the limit (when
ǫ converges to zero) is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)
2 (π11 + π22 − π12 − π21)
Proof. We can write the payoffs obtained by each type. Using the notation
π(y, y) = π33:

Πθ1(x
1, x2, y, (λ, 0)) = Πθ1 = (1− λ+ λσ) · π
11 + λ(1− σ) · π12
Πθ2(x
1, x2, y, (λ, 0)) = Πθ2 = (1− λ)(1− σ) · π
21 + (λ+ (1− λ)σ) · π22
Πτ (x
1, x2, y, (λ, 0)) = Πτ = (1− λ)(1− σ) · π
31 + λ(1− σ) · π32 + σ · π33
Since we are in a symmetric and finite fitness game, we can rewrite the payoffs
in function of the matrix payoff A using (14):

Πθ1 = x
1
[
(1− λ)(1− σ)Ax1 + λ(1− σ)Ax2
]
+ σx1Ax1
Πθ2 = x
2
[
(1− λ)(1− σ)Ax1 + λ(1− σ)Ax2
]
+ σx2Ax2
Πτ = y
[
(1− λ)(1− σ)Ax1 + λ(1− σ)Ax2
]
+ σyAy
From Payoff Equality, we know thatΠθ1 = Πθ2 = Πθ. Thus, γΠθ1+(1−γ)Πθ2 =
Πθ with γ ∈ R such that y = γx
1 + (1− γ)x2. We can then write the difference
between the payoff of the residents and the payoff of the mutant as follows:
Πθ −Πτ = γΠθ1 + (1− γ)Πθ2 −Πτ
= σ
(
γx1Ax1 + (1− γ)x2Ax2 − yAy
)
= σγ(1− γ)
(
x1Ax1 + x2Ax2 − x1Ax2 − x2Ax1
)
4 Note that the only case where this decomposition does not exist is when α1 = α2,
and this case is not possible in our analysis since we have x1 6= x2.
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We can further develop this expression, using the pure-strategies payoffs:

x1Ax1 = α21π11 + α1(1− α1)(π21 + π12) + (1− α1)
2π22
x2Ax2 = α22π11 + α2(1− α2)(π21 + π12) + (1− α2)
2π22
x1Ax2 = α1α2π11 + α1(1− α2)π12 + (1− α1)α2π21 + (1− α1)(1− α2)π22
x2Ax1 = α1α2π11 + α2(1− α1)π12 + (1− α2)α1π21 + (1− α1)(1− α2)π22
(15)
Rearranging, the difference in payoff is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)
2 (π11 + π22 − π12 − π21)

When studying the sign of this difference in payoffs, it is useful to understand
what is the sign of γ(1−γ). Without loss of generality and by symmetry we can
assume α2 < α1, i.e. θ1 plays the pure strategy 1 with a greater probability than
θ2. Let η be the probability that τ attaches to pure strategy 1, η = γα1+(1−γ)α2.
If η ∈ (α2, α1), then γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ(1 − γ) > 0. If η = α1 or η = α2, then
γ(1− γ) = 0. Else γ(1− γ) < 0 (see Fig. 3).
0 α2 η α1 1
γ(1− γ) > 0
0 α2 α1 η 1
γ(1− γ) < 0
Fig. 3. Sign of γ(1− γ) depending on probabilities attached to the first pure strategy
Before studying when a population of two residents is evolutionary stable, we
need to introduce one of the results of Alger and Weibull (2013) for symmetric
2× 2 fitness game.
Lemma 3 (Proposition 2 of Alger and Weibull (2013)). Let
xˆ(σ) = min
{
1,
π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22
(1 + σ)(π12 + π21 − π11 − π22)
}
When σ > 0,
1. If π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 > 0, then Xσ ⊆ {0, 1}.
2. If π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 = 0, then
Xσ =


{0}, if π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 < 0
[0, 1] , if π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 = 0
{1}, if π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 > 0
3. If π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 < 0, then
Xσ =
{
{0}, if π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 ≤ 0
{xˆ(σ)}, if π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 > 0
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We omit in what follows the case where σ = 0 (uniform random matching)
well-studied in the literature. The following proposition exhibits the link be-
tween Hamiltonian strategies and evolutionary stability of a population of two
residents:
Proposition 2 (Evolutionary stability in a symmetric 2×2 fitness game).
In a symmetric 2× 2 fitness game where the assortment is constant and strictly
positive, let (θ1, θ2, λ) be a population where θ1 plays x
1 , θ2 plays x
2, such that
(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2.
If Xσ is a singleton and if Θ is rich, then there does not exist any evolutionary
stable population made of two residents.
Proof. First, note that if the population does not respect the Payoff Equality
condition, it is not evolutionary stable. Thus, we consider next a population that
respects the Payoff Equality condition (Proposition 1). We know from Lemma 2
that the difference in payoffs between the residents and a mutant τ at the limit
satisfies:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)
2 (π11 + π22 − π12 − π21)
We can show using (15) that Spi = (α1−α2)
2 (π11 + π22 − π12 − π21). Hence,
rewriting the expression above, we have:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)Spi
We consider the three different cases in which Xσ is a singleton using Lemma 3:
1. If π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 > 0, Xσ = {0} or Xσ = {1},
Since Θ is rich, if θ1 or θ2 does not play pure strategies, it is always possible
to find a mutant such that γ(1−γ) < 0 (discussion of Fig.3). In this case the
difference between the two payoff above is negative and the mutant earns
more than the residents at the limit since σ > 0.
Else, if θ1 and θ2 both play pure strategies, then one of them is playing
the Hamiltonian strategy. Without loss of generality and by symmetry, sup-
pose θ1 is playing this Hamiltonian strategy, and that Xσ = {1} i.e. homo-
hamiltonensis and θ1 play the first pure strategy while θ2 plays the second
pure strategy. We are then in case 2. or 3. of Proposition 1 and we have
Qpi, Rpi ≥ 0 and Spi > 0. Let x ∈ X, such that x 6= x
2, i.e. x = (ρ, 1 − ρ)
with ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then:
(1− σ)π(x, x2) + σπ(x, x) = π22 − ρRpi − σρ(1− ρ)Spi
< π22
Thus, for all x in X such that x 6= x2, uσ(x, x
2) < uσ(x
2, x2). This means
that the strategy played by θ2, i.e. the second pure strategy is also a Hamil-
tonian strategy and thus Xσ = {0, 1} which contradicts the fact that Xσ is a
singleton. Hence there is no diverse evolutionary stable resident population
in this case.
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2. If π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 = 0. Hence, we have Spi = 0 (α1 6= α2 else the
residents play the same strategy). Thus, from Proposition 1, we also have
Qpi = Rpi = 0. Subtracting, the expression Qpi − Spi, using (15), we find:
Qpi − Spi = (α1 − α2)[α2(1 + σ)(π11 + π22 − π12 − π21) + (π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22)]
Hence, we have π12 + σπ21 − (1 + σ)π22 = 0. Therefore, case 2. of Lemma 3
implies that Xσ = [0, 1] and is not a singleton.
3. If π11 +π22−π12−π21 < 0, then since Θ is rich, it is always possible to find
a mutant such that γ(1 − γ) > 0 so that the mutant earns more than the
residents at the limit since σ > 0.
So in the different cases when Xσ is a singleton and Θ is rich, we have shown
that there exists a mutant that earns more than the residents at the limit. Using
Lemma 1 we can say that by continuity of the payoffs this strict inequality holds
in a neighborhood.

The proposition specifies cases when it is not possible to have a population of
two residents that is not evolutionary stable. Is there a case where evolutionary
stability for a population of two residents is actually possible? The answer is
yes, when Xσ = {0, 1}
5. Let Θi be the set of mutants τ that are behaviorally
indistinguishable from a resident θi. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Evolutionary stability in a symmetric 2×2 fitness game).
In a symmetric 2× 2 fitness game where the assortment is constant and strictly
positive. Suppose Xσ = {0, 1}, and let (θ1, θ2, λ) be a population where θ1 plays
x1 , θ2 plays x
2, such that (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 ⊂ X
2
σ, (x
1 6= x2) and λ =
Qpi/((1− σ)Spi) the share of θ2 in the population.
If βσ(x) is a singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) is evo-
lutionary stable against all types τ /∈ Θ1 ∪Θ2.
Proof. First, the population (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality condition
when the mutant is absent from Theorem 2 and we also have Spi > 0.
Then, from Lemma 2, we know that the difference in payoffs between the
residents and a mutant τ at the limit is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)
2 (π11 + π22 − π12 − π21)
Second, since (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 ⊂ X
2
σ and Xσ = {0, 1}, it means that
θ1 and θ2 will play the two pure strategies. Without loss of generality and by
symmetry, we can assume that θ1 plays the pure strategy 1 (α1 = 1), and that
θ2 plays the pure strategy 2 (α2 = 0). Thus, γ is actually the probability that
τ attaches to the pure strategy 1. Moreover, since τ /∈ Θ1 ∪ Θ2, the mutant
5 In the last possible case, Xσ = [0, 1], any strategy gives the same payoff meaning that
there does not exist a evolutionary stable population, even for single-type population
19
cannot play a pure strategy and γ ∈ (0, 1) i.e. γ(1 − γ) > 0. We also have
Spi = π11 + π22 − π12 − π21 > 0, and σ > 0.
Consequently, the difference in payoff at the limit is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)Spi > 0
We have shown:
Πθ1(x1, x2, y, (λ, 0)) > Πτ (x1, x2, y, (λ, 0))
and Πθ1(x1, x2, y, (λ, 0)) > Πτ (x1, x2, y, (λ, 0))
for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 in the population state s = (θ1, θ2, λ) and for any
τ /∈ Θ1 ∪Θ2.
We can then use Lemma 1, to conclude the proof by continuity.

This last theorem proves the existence of a heterogeneous and evolutionary
stable population in the particular case of a constant assortment function. In the
following section, we expose some examples and discuss the main implications.
5 Discussion and Examples
In this section, we first explore the question of evolutionary stability in the
examples we studied in Section 3. Then we discuss the differences between a
heterogeneous population and a population constituted by a single type of res-
ident. And we finally discuss the possibility of testing empirically this diversity
as well as potential future research strands.
5.1 Exemples
Example 3 (Coordination game).
In the coordination game we considered in Section 3, we had πAA = 2 and
πBB = 1. We saw that we had Payoff Equality when φ(λ) < 1/2.
In the case of a constant assortment: φ(λ) = σ = 1/5 ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], λ = 3/4,
and θ1 and θ2 get the same total payoff Π = 0.8. In this case we have Spi =
πAA + πBB = 3 > 0 We therefore know that the difference in payoffs between
the residents and the mutant is: Πθ − Πτ = σγ(1 − γ)Spi > 0 ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), and
we can conclude using Theorem 3 that this population is evolutionary stable.
Table 5. Coordination game example
A B
A (2, 2) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
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Example 4 (Prisoner’s dilemma).
In our examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, we study the evolutionary stability
of a population made of a homo-oeconomicus that always defects and a homo-
kantiensis that always cooperates.
(a) First example when πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4 and πDC = 6. With
a constant assortment σ = 1/3, then with λ = 1/2 the populations satisfies
the Payoff Equality condition. However, we have Spi = −1 < 0, and since the
difference in payoffs between the residents and the mutant is: Πθ−Πτ = σγ(1−
γ)Spi, any mutant would earn more than the residents! The population is not
evolutionary stable.
(b) Now let πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4 and πDC = 5, we have Spi = 0,
Qpi = −1 + 4φ(λ)) and Rpi = 1 − 4φ(λ). With a constant assortment σ = 1/4,
any λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Payoff Equality. On the other hand, any mutant would
also earn the same payoff. Actually this case contradicts the assumption that βσ
is a singleton since any strategy is a best reply.
(c) Finally, let πCD = 0, πDD = 1, πCC = 4 and πDC = 4.5. With a
constant assortment σ = 1/5, then with λ = 1/2 the populations satisfies the
Payoff Equality condition and Πθ = 12/5. Moreover, we have Spi = 0.5 > 0, and
the difference in payoffs between the residents and the mutant is: Πθ − Πτ =
σγ(1− γ)Spi > 0 ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. this population is evolutionary stable.
Table 6. Prisoner’s dilemma examples
(a)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 6)
D (6, 0) (1, 1)
(b)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
(c)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 4.5)
D (4.5, 0) (1, 1)
In the general case, there will exist a diverse evolutionary-stable population
in the prisoner dilemma if πCC+πDD−πDC−πCD > 0. If this condition is met,
then the evolutionary-stable population will be a mix of homo-oeconomicus and
homo-kantiensis. Note that this result is not the same as in Alger and Weibull
(2013). Indeed, in this case (πCC +πDD−πDC −πCD > 0), homo-hamiltonensis
would either cooperate or defect, i.e. everybody behaves as a homo-oeconomicus
and defects, or everybody behaves as a homo-kantiensis and cooperates. On
the other hand, we found a diverse evolutionary-stable population with a share
behaving as homo-oeconomicus and the other as homo-kantiensis.
5.2 Heterogenous population vs single-type Homo-hamiltonensis
resident
Using the frame of evolutionary stability formally established by Maynard Smith
and Price (1973), Alger and Weibull proved the evolutionary stability of a par-
ticular type of preference, homo-hamiltonensis. Although our paper also proves
the evolutionary superiority of Hamiltonian strategies in the case of a constant
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assortment function, it is important to note that our result has different implica-
tions. While, in the case of a single resident population, all the population neces-
sarily plays the same strategy thus imposing a unique expected played strategy,
we show that it is possible for a population to exhibit different behaviors and
different types of strategies played without infringing the evolutionary stability.
It is worthwhile insisting here on the importance of assortative matching in mak-
ing this diversity possible. As can be seen in example 4 above, it is because the
assortment function is strictly positive that homo-kantiensis can survive without
being eliminated by the homo-oeconomicus present in the resident population.
As first expectation about a diverse population exhibiting an evolutionary
stability against mutants, we could have hypothesized the fact that the popula-
tion would "on average" have a Hamiltonian preference in order to be coherent
with the main result of Alger and Weibull (2013). In other words, an apparently
good candidate diverse population would have been a population composed by
fully-selfish and fully-moral individuals with a share σ of fully moral individu-
als in order to be "coherent" with the Hamiltonian preference. However, as we
showed in Section 4 this case cannot be evolutionary stable whereas some other
can be. Consequently, our case of a diverse resident population is also differ-
ent from a homo-hamiltonensis playing a mixed strategy. In fact, in his thesis
John Nash exposed a second interpretation of mixed Nash equilibria (also called
mass-action), which would consist in large populations playing the pure strate-
gies composing the mixed equilibrium rather than a single player randomizing
his play (Leonard (1994)). The heterogeneous evolutionary stable population
we find above could have been an application of this case if we had a diversity
that mirrors a mixed Hamiltonian strategy. However, we showed in Section 4
that it is possible to have a diversity of resident populations even when homo-
hamiltonensis plays only pure strategies.
5.3 Empirical testing and further research
While empirical behavioral research often aims at finding the parameters of the
preferences of individuals, it would be an interesting challenge to try to esti-
mate the diversity of preference in a population considering the possibility of
the presence of several types of preferences in the analysis. We expect allowing
for diversity in the preferences of individuals to give a more precise estimation
of what is driving the strategic behavior of agents in assortative symmetric (fit-
ness) games. This paper aims at opening the way for analyses accounting for
a potential diversity of preferences. Many extensions and improvements can be
undertaken to deepen the understanding of heterogeneous populations. First,
exploring the possibility of a non-constant assortment function will offer a bet-
ter understanding of the role assortment plays in allowing for the diversity of
preferences and might imply the presence of evolutionary stable preference not
playing Hamiltonian strategies. Second, the assortative matching could be ex-
tended to more than three agents and it would be interesting identifies some
patterns allowing for a generalization of assortative games. Finally, the case of
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evolutionary stability of diverse populations could be extended to finite games
with more than two pure strategies and to infinite games.
6 Conclusion
Building on the analysis of Alger andWeibull (2013) which introduced the Homo-
moralis preference type and proved its evolutionary stability, this paper extends
the scope of analysis of evolutionary stability in the context of assortative inter-
action with imperfect information. Introducing a tripartite assortment function
and the Payoff Equality condition in the case of two competing resident popula-
tions, we prove the existence of diverse and evolutionary stable equilibria. Using
the case of constant assortment function we prove the possibility of co-existence
of two different types in the population being together evolutionary stable. This
paper aims at opening the way towards better consideration of the diversity of
preferences moving away from the more classical use of representative agents
and homogeneous populations.
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